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ABSTRACT
Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is an enabling technology in modern transportation systems for
providing safety and valuable information, and yet vulnerable to a number of attacks from passive
eavesdropping to active interfering. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are important devices that
can mitigate the threats by detecting malicious behaviors. Furthermore, the collaborations among
vehicles in VANETs can improve the detection accuracy by communicating their experiences between
nodes. To this end, distributed machine learning is a suitable framework for the design of scalable
and implementable collaborative detection algorithms over VANETs. One fundamental barrier to
collaborative learning is the privacy concern as nodes exchange data among them. A malicious node
can obtain sensitive information of other nodes by inferring from the observed data. In this paper, we
propose a privacy-preserving machine-learning based collaborative IDS (PML-CIDS) for VANETs.
The proposed algorithm employs the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) to a class
of empirical risk minimization (ERM) problems and trains a classifier to detect the intrusions in
the VANETs. We use the differential privacy to capture the privacy notation of the PML-CIDS and
propose a method of dual variable perturbation to provide dynamic differential privacy. We analyze
theoretical performance and characterize the fundamental tradeoff between the security and privacy of
the PML-CIDS. We also conduct numerical experiments using the NSL-KDD dataset to corroborate
the results on the detection accuracy, security-privacy tradeoffs, and design.
Keywords Privacy · Differential privacy · Cybersecurity · VANET · Intrusion detection
1 Introduction
With a growing number of vehicles on road and the rapid development of autonomous vehicles, road safety becomes an
increasingly important issue. Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) provides a communication system that enables the
dissemination of safety-related information, traffic management, navigation, and road services. However, it is known
that VANETs are vulnerable to a number of attacks from passive eavesdropping to active interfering [1]. For example,
an attacker can eavesdrop and log the messages of other vehicles, and replay them to access specific resources such as
toll services. An attacker can intrude a specific vehicle, impersonate its identity, and send out false warnings that can
disrupt the highway traffic [1].
Intrusion detection plays an important role in mitigating the threat of VANETs by using signature-based and/or
anomaly-based approaches to detect adversarial behaviors [2]. Among many architectures of IDSs, the collaborative
IDSs (CIDSs) have been proposed to enable the sharing of detection knowledge about known and unknown attacks and
increase detection accuracy [3, 4, 5]. Distributed machine learning algorithms provide an appropriate framework for
CIDSs to classify adversarial behaviors using local datasets and share knowledge to increase the detection accuracy.
In this paper, we consider the network-level intrusion attacks on computer system [6, 7] and take advantage of the
collaborative nature of the VANETs and design a system architecture of a distributed machine-learning based CIDS
over a VANET. The CIDS enables each vehicle to utilize the knowledge of the labeled training data of other vehicles;
thus, it boosts the training data size for each vehicle without actually burdening the storage capacity of each vehicle.
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Also, the laborious task of collecting labeled data can be distributed to all the vehicles in a VANET, thereby reducing the
workload of each vehicle. Moreover, the CIDS enables the vehicles to share knowledge of each other without directly
exchanging the training data. In addition, the CIDS provides the scalability of the training data processing and improves
the quality of decision-making, while reducing the computational cost. The alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMM) [8] is one suitable approach to decentralizing the machine learning problem over a network that allows nodes
over the network to share their classification results and yields the optimal classifier achieved under the centralized
learning. Despite the distributed feature of the learning algorithm, the data communications between different vehicles
can create serious privacy concerns of the training data in each vehicle when an adversary can observe the outcome of
the learning and extract the sensitive information of the training data of each vehicle. The adversary can either be a
vehicle of the VANET which observes its neighboring vehicles or malicious outsider who can observe the outputs of
learning.
The lack of privacy protection mechanism often creates barriers for information sharing and disincentives for nodes to
achieve collaboration. Therefore, a privacy-preserving mechanism is important to protect the training data privacy over
the network and achieve an effective CIDS. Differential privacy proposed in [9] has been a well-defined concept that
can provide a strong privacy guarantee by which a change of any single entry of the dataset can only slightly change the
distribution of the responses of the dataset.
Therefore, this work proposes a privacy-preserving machine-learning based collaborative IDS (PML-CIDS) for the
VANET. We first employ ADMM to construct a distributed empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem over a VANET
so that a classifier can be trained in a decentralized fashion to detect whether an activity is normal or attack. We extend
the differential privacy to dynamic differential privacy to capture the privacy notation in the distributed machine learning
of the CIDS, and propose a privacy-preserving approach, dual variable perturbation (DVP). We also investigate the
performance of the DVP and characterize the fundamental tradeoff between security and privacy of the PML-CIDS
by formulating convex optimization problems and conduct numerical experiments based on the NSL-KDD dataset to
demonstrate the optimal design of the privacy mechanism. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
(i) We propose a machine-learning-based CIDS architecture to enable the collaborative information exchange and
knowledge sharing in VANETs.
(ii) We use ADMM to capture the distributed nature of a VANET and construct a collaborative learning over a
VANET based on a regularized ERM algorithm.
(iii) We develop the DVP method to perturb the dual variables before minimizing the augmented Lagrange function
at each ADMM iteration. The DVP is shown to guarantee dynamic differential privacy in the collaborative
learning of the CIDS for a VANET.
(iv) We investigate the theoretical performance of the DVP, which is measured by the minimum training data size
required to achieve a low error.
(v) We provide a design principle to find the optimal value of the privacy parameter by solving an optimization
problem to manage the tradeoff between security and privacy of a VANET.
1.1 Related Work
Many works have studied various architectures of intrusion detection systems that are well-suited to MANET [3]. Most
architectures for MANET can be classified into three categories. The first is the distributed and cooperative IDS, which
captures the distributed nature of MANET that has the potential for constructing cooperations over the network. For
example, Zhang and Lee in [10] have utilized this nature of MANET and constructed a model for a distributed and
cooperative IDS. Also, Albers et al. have proposed a collaborative IDS based on local IDS by using mobile agents in
[11]. The local IDS is implemented on each node of the MANET for local node-based security concerns, which can be
extended to deal with the global security issues by establishing a collaboration among local IDSs over the MANET. The
second category is hierarchical IDS model that extends the distributed and cooperative architectures. In [12], Sterne et
al. have designed a dynamic hierarchical IDS using multilevel clustering. The third architecture uses the concept of
mobile agents, which can move through the large network. In this type of framework, each mobile agent is assigned
to work on a single specific task; then one or multiple mobile agents are distributed into each node in the MANET.
Previous research includes the work of Kachirski and Guha in [13] that has proposed distributed IDSs using multiple
sensors based on mobile agent technology; and thus, the workload is distributed by separating functional tasks and
assigning the tasks to different agents.
Machine learning and data mining for IDSs have also been studied in the literature. These techniques enable the IDS
to continuously learn attacks and their behaviors, enhance the knowledge of the security system, make connections
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Figure 1. A VANET scenario: TMC: traffic management center; V2V: vehicle-to-vehicle communications; V2I: vehicle-to-
infrastructure communications; I2I: infrastructure-to-infrastructure communications. Each vehicle is equipped with an OBU and an
AU.
between suspicious events, and predict the occurrence of an attack. Researchers have studied the unsupervised learning
such as the technique of clustering, which is an unsupervised pattern discovery method, in IDSs. There are several
approaches for clustering the unlabeled data; for example, Blowers and Williams [14] have applied a density-based
spatial clustering of applications with noise clustering algorithm to group normal versus anomalous network packets.
Other clustering based work includes hierarchical clustering [15] and K-means [16]. There is also literature on the IDS
with supervised learning such as support vector machine [17]. For example, Wagner et al. [18] have applied one-class
SVM classifier and used a new window kernel to find the anomaly based on time position of the data. Other methods
using supervised learning include decision trees [19, 20, 21], artificial neural networks [22, 23], and sequential data
aggregation [24, 25]. There also have been works on intrusion-prediction based detection using non-machine-learning
techniques [26, 27]. For example, Nidhal et al. [28] have designed a game-theoretic intrusion detection approach for
VANET. The game-based model can predict a possible future denial-of-service attack on the monitored nodes.
In the field of differential privacy, there is a number of works on applying differential privacy to machine learning
[29, 30, 31, 32, 33]. Kasiviswanathan et al. [29], for instance, have driven a general method for probabilistically
approximately correct learning. A body of literature has studied the tradeoff between the privacy and the performance
of machine learning while exploring the theory of differential privacy (e.g., [9, 34, 35]). Also, an increasing number
of researchers focus on the distributed differential privacy. Eigner and Maffei have developed the framework for
the automated verification of distributed differential privacy in [36] to enforce the distributed differential privacy in
cryptographic protocol implementations. Han et al. [37] have proposed a differentially private algorithm to solve
a distributed constrained optimization based on distributed projected gradient descent to protect the privacy of the
constraint set. Hale et al. [38] have used a cloud computer to perform differentially private computations so that the
broadcasts of the results to each agent over the network do not leak the private state of each agent. In this paper, we
have developed a collaborative IDS using distributed machine learning and resolve the barrier of privacy issues by
proposing the concept of dynamic differential privacy to protect the privacy of the training dataset used in the learning.
1.2 Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the PML-CIDS architecture. Section 3 presents the
model of the collaborative learning over a VANET for IDS. The ADMM approach is used to decentralize a centralized
ERM problem that models the collaborative learning in the VANET. We also describe the privacy concerns associated
with the ADMM-based collaborative learning and define the dynamic differential privacy. Section 4 proposes the DVP
algorithm to provide dynamic differential privacy. Then, we study the performance of the DVP algorithm in Section
5. Section 6 shows numerical experiments to corroborate the theoretical results and the optimal design principle to a
tradeoff between security and privacy. Finally, Section 7 presents the concluding remarks and future research directions.
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Algorithm 1 PML-CIDS
Input: Real-time VANET system data: Local audit data flow and activity logs.
Step 1: The pre-processing engine collects and pre-processes the real-time VANET system data, by numerical
transformation, features selection, and data normalization.
if The classifier needs update then
Step 2: The P-CML engine is initiated and local training dataset is loaded. And updated classifier is obtained.
Step 3: The local detection engine uses the newly updated classifier to analyze the real-time VANET system data.
If any activities are classified as intrusions, the local detection engine triggers the alarm.
else
Step 2: The local detection engine uses the current classifier to analyze the real-time VANET system data and
triggers the alarm when any activities are classified as intrusions.
end if
2 PML-CIDS Model
In this section, we describe the architecture of the proposed PML-CIDS which includes multiple building blocks
for VANETs. Illustrated in Figure 1, a general VANET consists of on-board units (OBU), application units (AU),
and roadside units (RSU). The communication between OBUs (vehicle-to-vehicle), or between an OBU and an RSU
(vehicle-to-infrastructure) is based on wireless access in-vehicle environment (WAVE) [3]. The RSUs can also connect
to other infrastructures such as other RSUs and traffic management center, and the communications between them
(infrastructure-to-infrastructure) are through other wireless technology. Each vehicle is equipped with an OBU and one
or multiple AUs. It also has a set of sensors to collect information and use the OBU to exchange information with other
OBUs or RSUs. Details about the three main components of the VANET architecture are presented in the Appendix A.1
for interested readers.
Each vehicle is equipped with one local PML-CIDS agent as shown in Figure 2 to monitor its local activities including
the ones in the AU and the communications via the OBU. Conceptually, the collaborative system consists of three main
components, namely, pre-processing engine, a local detection engine, and privacy-preserving collaborative machine
learning (P-CML) engine. The logical flow of a PML-CIDS is illustrated in Algorithm 1. The pre-processing engine
gathers and pre-processes the real-time VANET system data that describe the system activities in a vehicle. The
pre-processed system data is then analyzed by the local detection engine using classification techniques. If the user
of the vehicle requires the current classifier to be updated, then the P-CML engine is initiated. The local detection
engine uses the newly retained classifier to analyze the system data. Otherwise, the current classifier is used in the
classification of intrusions. If any intrusion is classified, the alarm is triggered. Each component of the PML-CIDS is
elaborated further in Appendix A.2. One essential component of the CIDS is the P-CML engine which is composed of
the collaborative communication (CC) engine, distributed local learning (DLL), and privacy-preserving (PP) mechanism.
The details of these building blocks will be described in detail Section 3.
Figure 2. Architecture of PML-CIDS: The Pre-processing engine collects and pre-processes the local audit data flow. The local
detection engine then analyzes the pre-processed data using a classifier. If the user of the vehicle requires an update of the classifier,
the P-CML engine is initiated. After collaborative learning, the updated classifier will be used in the intrusion detection.
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3 Dynamically Distributed Private Collaborative Learning
In this section, we describe the CC engine and the DLL of the P-CML engine in the PML-CIDS. We first model the
machine learning by a centralized regularized empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem, which is then decentralized
by the ADMM approach. The privacy concerns are then described, and a definition of dynamic differential privacy is
provided. In our model, the vehicles and infrastructures are treated equally except that the infrastructures are static
and have more data processing capacity. Therefore, without loss of generality, in the rest of paper, we focus on the
vehicle-to-vehicle communications.
Figure 3. Connected networks: The colored nodes represent the vehicles; v is the local center of the one-hop neighborhood
composed of i, j, and k; v only communicates with i, j, and k.
3.1 Distributed Learning over a VANET
Consider a connected VANET, which consists of P vehicles, described by an undirected graph G(V ,E ) as shown
in Figure 3 at time t, with the set of vehicles V = {1,2,3, ...,P}, and a set of edges E denoting the links between
connected vehicles. In general, the graph can change over time as the nodes move. Here we introduce the framework
with a fixed topology, and it can be easily extended to dynamic regimes. A particular vehicle v ∈ V only exchanges
information between its neighboring vehicle w ∈Nv, where Nv is the set of all neighboring vehicles of v. Each
vehicle stores a labeled training dataset Dv = {(xiv,yiv)⊂ X×Y : i = 0,1, · · · ,nv} of size nv, where xiv ∈ X ⊆Rd and
yiv ∈ Y := {−1,1} are the data vector and the corresponding label, respectively. The entire network therefore has a set
of data Dˆ =
⋃
v∈V Dv. The training dataset Dv of v ∈ V contains data points describing the VANET system activities
such as user and application activities and communication activities through the OBUs; each data point is labeled as an
intrusion (1) or a normal activity (−1). Labeling is important, which is even true for the pure anomaly detection [17].
The labeled training dataset must have both the normal data and the intrusion data including the novel attack data.
The collaborative learning in our model should be distributed over a VANET without direct data sharing. The alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is a suitable approach for our model. In this work, we focus on a class
of distributed ADMM-based empirical risk minimization (ERM) as the supervised learning algorithm used in the
collaborative learning. Each collaborative learning can be modeled as an optimization problem to find a classifier
f : X → Y using all available data Dˆ that enable all vehicles in the ad hoc network to classify any input data x′ (i.e.,
data flow collected and pre-processed by pre-processing engine) to a label y′ ∈ {−1,1}, where −1 and 1 denote normal
activities and intrusions, respectively. Before introducing the ADMM-based distributed learning, we first present the
centralized optimization in the next subsection.
3.1.1 Centralized Optimization
Let Z1( f |Dˆ) be the centralized objective function of a regularized empirical risk minimization problem (C-ERM). Thus,
the C-ERM problem can be defined as:
min
f
Z1( f |Dˆ) := C1nv
P
∑
v=1
nv
∑
i=1
Lˆ (yiv, f T xiv)+κR( f ), (1)
where C1 ≤ nv is a regularization parameter and κ > 0 is the parameter that controls the impact of the regularizer.
Lˆ (yiv, f T xiv) :R×Rd×Rd →R is the loss function that measures the quality of the trained classifier. In this work,
we focus on the specific loss function Lˆ (yiv, f T xiv) =L (yiv f T xiv). The regularizer function R( f ) in (1) is used to
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prevent overfitting. Suppose that Dˆ is available to the fusion center vehicle, a global classifier f : X → Y is chosen by
optimizing the C-ERM.
3.1.2 Distributed Optimization
To solve the problem by ADMM, we first decentralize the C-ERM problem by introducing the decision variables
{ fv}Pv=1; then, vehicle v determines its own classifier fv. We impose consensus constraints f1 = f2 = ... = fP to
guarantee the global consistency of the classifiers. Let {svw} be the auxiliary variables to decouple fv of the vehicle v
from its neighbors w ∈Nv in the VANET. Then, the consensus-based reformulation of C-ERM becomes
min
{ fv}Pv=1
Z2 :=
C1
nv
P
∑
v=1
nv
∑
i=1
L (yiv f Tv xiv)+P
P
∑
v=1
κR( fv),
s.t. fv = svw, svw = fv,v = 1, ...,P,w ∈Nv,
(2)
where Z2({ fv}v∈V |Dˆ) is the reformulated objective as a function of { fv}Pv=1. According to Lemma 1 in [39], if { fv}Pv=1
presents a feasible solution of (2) and the network is connected, then problems (1) and (2) are equivalent, i.e., f = fv, for
all v = 1, ...,P, where f is a feasible solution of C-ERM. Let ρ = Pκ . Problem (2) can be solved in a distributed fashion
using ADMM with each vehicle v ∈ V optimizing the following distributed regularized empirical risk minimization
problem (D-ERM):
Zv( fv|Dv) := C1nv
nv
∑
i=1
L (yiv f Tv xiv)+ρR( fv). (3)
The augmented Lagrange function associated with the D-ERM is:
LDv ( fv,svw,λ
k
vw) =Zv+ ∑
i∈Nv
(
λ avi
)T
( fv− svi)+ ∑
i∈Nv
(
λ bvi
)T
(svi− fi)
+
η
2 ∑i∈Nv
(‖ fv− svi ‖2 + ‖ svi− fi ‖2).
(4)
Therefore, the distributed iterative procedures to solve (3) are:
fv(t+1) = argmin
fv
LDv
(
fv,svw(t),λ kvw(t)
)
, (5)
svw(t+1) = argmin
svw
LDv
(
fv(t+1),svw,λ kvw(t)
)
, (6)
λ avw(t+1) = λ
a
vw(t)+η( fv(t+1)− svw(t+1)),
v ∈ V , w ∈Nv, (7)
λ bvw(t+1) = λ
b
vw(t)+η(svw(t+1)− fv(t+1)),
v ∈ V , w ∈Nv.
(8)
Here, svw(t + 1) in (6) can be found in closed form because the cost in (6) is linear-quadratic in svw(t + 1)[39]. By
substituting the closed-form solution, we can eliminate svw(t+1) from LDv ; this approach makes it possible to simplify
the iterative procedures (5) to (8). Indeed, according to Lemma 3 in [39], we can further simplify the distributed
iterative procedures by initializing the dual variables λ kvw = 0d×d and combining the two sets of dual variables into one
as λv(t) = ∑w∈Nv λ
k
vw, v ∈ V , w ∈Nv, k = a, b. Then, we can combine (7) and (8) into one update. We simplify (5)-(8)
by introducing the following. Let LNv (t) be the short-hand notation of L
N
v ({ fv},{ fv(t)},{λv(t)}) as :
LNv (t) :=
C1
nv
nv
∑
i=1
L (yiv f Tv xiv)+ρR( fv)+2λv(t)
T fv+η ∑
i∈Nv
‖ fv− 12 ( fv(t)+ fi(t)) ‖
2, (9)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the l2 norm throughout this paper.
The ADMM iterative procedures (5)-(8) are reduced to
fv(t+1) = argmin
fv
LNv ( fv, fv(t),λv(t)), (10)
λv(t+1) = λv(t)+
η
2 ∑w∈Nv
[ fv(t+1)− fw(t+1)]. (11)
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Algorithm 2 Distributed ERM over VANET
Required: Randomly initialize fv,λv = 0d×1 for every v ∈ V
Input: Dˆ
for t = 0,1,2,3, ... do
for v = 0 to P do
Compute fv(t+1) via (10).
end for
for v = 0 to P do
Broadcast fv(t+1) to all neighboring vehicles w ∈Nv.
end for
for p = 0 to P do
Compute λv(t+1) via (11).
end for
end for
Output: f ∗ = fv, for all v ∈ V .
Algorithm 2 summarizes the (non-private) distributed ERM over a VANET. At iteration t+1, vehicle v updates its local
fv(t) through (10). Next, v broadcasts the latest fv(t+1) to all its neighboring vehicles w ∈Nv. When each vehicle has
updated λv(t+1) via (11), iteration t+1 finishes. Throughout the entire algorithm, each vehicle v ∈ V only updates
its own fv(t) and λv(t) and the only information exchanged between neighboring vehicles is fv(t); thus, direct data
sharing is avoided. There are several methods to solve (10). For example, projected gradient method, Newton method,
and Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno method [40] that approximates the Newton method, to name a few. In this
distributed algorithm, each vehicle solves a minimization problem per iteration using its local training dataset. The only
information in the message transmitted by the OBUs between neighboring vehicles is the value of fv(t).
ADMM-based distributed machine learning has benefits due to its high scalability. It also provides a certain degree of
privacy since vehicles do not share training data directly. However, the privacy issue arises when powerful adversaries
can make intelligent inferences at each step of the collaborative learning and extract the privacy information contained
in the training dataset based on their observation of the learning output of each vehicle. Simple anonymization or
conventional sanitization is not sufficient to address the privacy issue as mentioned in the introduction. In the next
subsection, we will discuss the privacy concerns about the training data, and propose differential privacy solutions.
3.2 Privacy Concerns
As mentioned in the last subsection, the data stored at each vehicle is not exchanged during the entire ADMM algorithm;
however, the potential privacy risk still exists. Suppose that the dataset Dv stored at vehicle v contains sensitive
information in data point (xs,ys) that is not allowed to be known by anyone else. Consider the worst-case scenario when
the adversaries know every data point of training data except (xs,ys). There exist risks that the information about the
sensitive data can be extracted by observing the output of the non-private ADMM-based distributed learning algorithm
when the output is transmitted by OBU.
In this paper, we consider a linear classifier fv. The classifier fv that minimizes the ERM is a linear combination of
data points with the labels, which constitute the entire or a subset of the training dataset, near the decision boundary.
Let these data-label pairs constitute a subset of the training dataset D, which is denoted as Sb(D). Let A1(·) :Rd →R
represent Algorithm 2 with the output fv = A1(Dv) given the dataset Dv. Let D′v be any dataset such that Dv and D′v
differ by only one data point. Let (xs,ys) ⊂ Dv and (x′s,y′s) ⊂ D′v be the only pair of data points that are different,
i.e., (xs,ys) 6= (x′s,y′s). Suppose f = A1(D′v). If (xs,ys) ∈ Sb(Dv) and (x′s,y′s) ∈ Sb(D′v), then P(A1(D′v) = f ) = 0 (thus,
P(A1(Dv)= fv)
P(A1(D′v)= f )
= ∞).
Before describing the attack model, we first introduce the following notations. Let Ar :Rd →R be the randomized
version of Algorithm 2, and let { f ∗v }v∈V be the output of A1. It has been proved (e.g., [39]) that if the number of
iterations t→ ∞, f ∗1 = f ∗2 = · · ·= f ∗P = f ∗, where f ∗ is the optimal solution of C-ERM. Since A1 is deterministic, the
output { f ∗v }v∈V is deterministic. In the randomized algorithm, the vehicle v optimizes its local regularized empirical
risk using its own training dataset. Let Artv be the vehicle-v-dependent stochastic sub-algorithm of A
r at iteration t, and
let fv(t) be the output of Artv(Dv) at iteration t with dataset Dv. Therefore, fv(t) is stochastic at each t.
We consider the following attack model. The adversary can access the output at every iteration as well as the final output.
This type of adversary aims to obtain the sensitive information contained in the private data point in the training dataset
by observing the output fv(t) or f ∗v for all v ∈ V at each iteration t, not limited to the first iteration. We protect the
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privacy of distributed learning over a VANET using the definition of differential privacy proposed in [9]. Specifically,
we require that a change of any single data point in the dataset might only change the distribution of the output of the
algorithm slightly. It can be realized by adding randomness to the output of the algorithm. Recent advances in the
privacy-preserving machine learning techniques are not directly applicable since ADMM algorithms are iterative and
dynamic; hence we need to extend the notion of privacy to dynamically differential privacy. To protect the privacy
of training data against the adversary in the collaborative learning of a VANET, we propose the concept of dynamic
differential privacy, which enables the D-ERM to be privacy-preserving at every stage of learning.
Definition 1. (Dynamic α(t)-Differential Privacy (DDP)) Consider a network of P nodes V = {1, 2, ..., P}, and each
node v has a training dataset Dv, and Dˆ =
⋃
v∈V Dv. Let Ar :Rd →R be a randomized version of Algorithm 2. Let
α(t) = (α1(t),α2(t), ...,αP(t)) ∈RP+, where αv(t) ∈R+ is the privacy parameter of node v at iteration t. Let Artv be
the node-v-dependent sub-algorithm of Ar, which corresponds to an ADMM iteration at t that outputs fv(t). Let D′v be
any dataset with Hd(D′v,Dv) = 1, and gv(t) = Artv(D′v). We say that the algorithm Ar is dynamically αv(t)-differentially
private (DDP) if for any dataset D′v, and for all v ∈ V that can be observed by the adversaries, and for all possible sets
of the outcomes S⊆R, the following inequality holds:
Pr[ fv(t) ∈ S]≤ eαv(t) ·Pr[gv(t) ∈ S], (12)
for all t ∈ Z during a learning process. The probability is taken with respect to fv(t), the output of Artv at every stage t.
The algorithm Ar is called dynamically α(t)-differentially private if the above conditions are satisfied.
Definition 1 provides a suitable differential privacy concept for the adversary in the collaborative learning of a VANET.
For DDP algorithm, the adversaries cannot extract additional information of the private data by observing the fv(t) at
any vehicle v any iteration t. As mentioned above, Algorithm 2 is not DDP since P(A1(Dv)= fv)P(A1(D′v)= f ) → ∞. Please note that
the optimization at each iteration in ADMM-based learning is uncoupled from each other different iteration. Also,
the optimization at each vehicle is uncoupled from each other. These properties of ADMM make it possible to treat
the privacy of each vehicle each iteration independently. In the definition of DDP, the strength of privacy of vehicle v
iteration t totally depends on the value of αv(t) chosen at t, which is independent of the number of αw(t ′) for all w 6= v
and t ′ 6= t. Therefore, the DDP is also independent of the number of iterations. Since each iteration is private, there
are no opportunities for privacy leakage in previous iterations the adversaries can take advantage of to extract more
information in later iterations.
Figure 4. Illustration of DVP during intermediate iterations. The perturbed βv participates in PP mechanism, described by (14). As
a result, the output fv at each iteration is a random variable, and the transmission of fv is differentially private. The evil red face
represents the adversary and the red lighting refer to the possible privacy leakage positions.
4 Private Collaboration: Dual Variable Perturbation
In the previous section, we have defined a dynamic differential privacy that can capture the notation of data privacy
in the collaborative learning over a VANET. In this section, we propose an approach for the privacy-preserving
mechanism based on the definition of dynamic differential privacy: Dual Variable Perturbation (DVP), and describe the
mathematical models of all three components of the P-CML, namely, the PP mechanism, the DLL, and the CC engine.
DVP is proved to be DDP by adding appropriate noise to the deterministic algorithms if the following assumptions are
satisfied:
Assumption 1. The loss functionL is strictly convex and doubly differentiable of f with |L ′| ≤ 1 and |L ′′| ≤C2,
where C2 is a constant. BothL andL ′ are continuous.
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Algorithm 3 Dual Variable Perturbation
1: Required: Randomly initialize fv,λv = 0d×1 for every v ∈ V
2: Input: Dˆ, {[αv(1),αv(2), ...]}Pv=1
3: for t = 0,1,2,3, ... do
4: for v = 1 to P do
5: Let αˆv = αv(t)− ln
(
1+ C2nv
C1
(
ρ+2ηNv
))2.
6: if αˆv > 0 then
7: Φ= 0.
8: else
9: Φ= C2nv
C1
(eαv(t)/4−1)− ρ−2ηNv and αˆv = αv(t)/2, where Nv is the number of neighboring vehicles of v.
10: end if
11: Draw noise εv(t) according toKv(ε)∼ e−ζv(t)‖ε‖ with ζv(t) = αˆv.
12: PP: Compute βv(t+1) via (14).
13: DLL Part 1: Compute fv(t+1) via (15) with augmented Lagrange function as (13).
14: end for
15: for v = 0 to P do
16: CC: Broadcast fv(t+1) to all neighboring vehicles w ∈Nv.
17: end for
18: for v = 0 to P do
19: DLL Part 2: Compute λv(t+1) via (16).
20: end for
21: end for
22: Output: { f ∗v }Pv=1.
Assumption 2. The regularizer function R(·) is continuous, differentiable, and 1-strongly convex. Both R(·) and ∇R(·)
are continuous.
Assumption 3. We assume that ‖xiv‖≤ 1. Since yiv ∈ {−1,1}, |yiv|= 1.
Specifically, the DVP provides DDP by perturbing the dual variables {λv(t)}Pv=1 with a random noise vector εv(t) ∈Rd
with the probability density function
Kv(ε)∼ e−ζv(t)‖ε‖,
where ζv(t) is a function of αv(t). In this approach, we add an additional term Φ2 ‖ fv ‖2 to the objective function
(3) to make sure that the objective function associated with (13) is at least Φ-strongly convex. Each iteration starts
with perturbing the dual variable λv(t) updated in the last iteration to a new variable β (t) = λv(t)+ C12nv εv(t). Then,
the corresponding vehicle-v-based augmented Lagrange function LNv (t) becomes L
dual
v
(
fv, fv(t),βv(t+1),{ fi(t)}i∈Nv
)
.
Let Ldualv (t) be a short-hand notation and we have:
Ldualv (t) =Zv( fv|Dv)+
Φ
2
‖ fv ‖2 +2βv(t+1)T fv+η ∑
i∈Nv
‖ fv− 12 ( fv(t)+ fi(t)) ‖
2 . (13)
Thus, the randomness caused by adding noise εv(t) randomizes the minimizer of Ldualv (t). Let CLK denote the K-th
(randomized) collaboration. Suppose each CLK includes TK iterations (TK can be varying in K). In our model, the t-th
iteration of CLK is varying in K for all t ∈ {1, · · · ,TK}. This is because that the mechanism at t involves fv(t−1) and
βv(t−1), whose values that were updated in the last iteration t−1 are varying due to the random noise at each t−1
and at each K.
Now we can model three components of the P-CML as:
• PP mechanism: dual variable λv(t) is perturbed using Laplace noise εv(t+1),
βv(t+1) = λv(t)+
C1
2nv
εv(t+1). (14)
• DLL part 1: fv(t+1) is updated by minimizing Ldualv (t),
fv(t+1) = argmin
fv
Ldualv (t). (15)
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• CC engine: Broadcast fv(t+1) to all neighboring vehicles w ∈Nv.
• DLL part 2: λv(t+1) is updated using all the { fw(t+1)}w∈Nv from the neighboring vehicles and fv(t+1),
λv(t+1) = λv(t)+
η
2 ∑w∈Nv
[ fv(t+1)− fw(t+1)]. (16)
The iterations (14)-(16) are summarized in Algorithm 3. Specifically, we have introduced an additional privacy
parameter αˆv = αv(t)−2ln
(
1+ C2nv
C1
(
ρ+2ηNv
)), where Nv is the number of neighboring vehicles of v. αˆv is required in
the proof of Theorem 1. Two cases of αˆv are necessary to find the upper bound of the ratio of the Jacobian matrices of
the transformation from fv(t) to εv(t) given different datasets (see details in Appendix A in [41]). Figure 4 illustrates
each iteration of Algorithm 3. After the P-CML engine has established a collaboration with neighboring vehicles over a
VANET, the ADMM iterations begin. Initially, the DLL at each vehicle generates an initial λv(0) = 0 and a random
initial fv(0). fv(0) is shared with neighboring vehicles via the CC engine. Every vehicle v ∈ V determines its own value
of ρ and updates its local parameters βv(t), fv(t) and λv(t) at time t. At iteration t+1, the PP mechanism of v perturbs
the λv(t−1) by a Laplace noise εv(t) to generate βv(t) as shown in (14). Then, the DLL uses βv(t), { fw(t−1)}w∈Nv ,
and the local labeled training dataset Dv to update the fv(t) as shown in (15). The CC engine transmits fv(t) to all the
neighboring vehicles, and at the same time, it receives { fw(t)}w∈Nv . Each iteration resumes after the DLL has updated
the λv(t) using { fw(t)}w∈Nv , fv(t), and λv(t−1) according to (16). After the P-CML terminates, it transmits the final
updated classifier f ∗v to the local detection engine for intrusion detection. The privacy guarantee of DVP is summarized
in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3, Algorithm 3 solving D-ERM is dynamically α(t)-differentially private with
α(t) = (α1(t),α2(t), ...,αP(t)), where αv(t) is chosen by each vehicle v∈ V at time t. Let Q( fv(t)|Dv) and Q( fv(t)|D′v)
be the probability density functions of fv(t) given dataset Dv and D′v, respectively, with Hd(Dv,D′v) = 1. The ratio of
conditional probabilities of fv(t) is bounded as follows:
Q( fv(t)|Dv)
Q( fv(t)|D′v)
≤ eαv(t). (17)
Proof. See Appendix A in [32].
Remark 1. In practice, the VANET topology frequently changes due to the mobility of the vehicles. The change of
topology can be caused by the changes of the position, the speed, and the number of vehicles. Therefore, it is possible
that the VANET topology changes during the collaborative learning. Section 3.2 has explained the independence of
dynamical differential privacy. Since the dynamic differential privacy of the training dataset at v is independent of other
iterations and the number of iterations, we can conclude that the DVP algorithm is independent of the speed of the
vehicles. Also, the privacy of v is independent of the activities at other vehicles; thus the DVP at v is also independent
of the mobility of vehicles in the VANET. Therefore, the dynamic differential privacy and the Algorithm 3 work in the
topology-varying VANET. Let nv(t) represent the time-varying number of vehicles in the topology-varying VANET.
Let Nv(t) and Nv(t) denote the time-varying set of neighboring vehicles and the number of neighboring vehicles,
respectively. By substituting the time-varying nv(t), Nv(t) and Nv(t) into equations (14)-(16), the algorithm is also
dynamically differentially private in the topology-varying VANET.
Remark 2. In this model, the learning is a continuous progress and we do not specify a time window of learning
for each vehicle v. Specifically, each v decides when to start a new collaborative learning to update the previously
updated classifier f 1v , or to stop a collaborative learning in progress and keep the newly updated classifier f
2
v as the
latest intrusion classifier. Continuous learning is important since the training data keeps being updated. The machine
learning algorithm can benefit from the frequent changes of dataset to continuously learn different kinds of attacks and
their behaviors and enhancing the knowledge of the security system.
5 Performance Analysis
In this section, we discuss the performance of Algorithm 3. The training data stored at each vehicle is labeled as 1
(attack) or −1 (normal). We consider two types of errors: false positive error and false negative error. The false positive
(or false negative) refers to labeling a data point x′′ as 1 (or−1) when actually x′′ is−1 (or 1). We establish performance
bounds for the l2 norm regularization functions such that we can train a classifier with low false positive and low false
negative. The performance analysis is based on the following assumptions:
Assumption 4. The data-label pair {(xvi,yvi)}nvi=1 are drawn i.i.d. from a fixed but unknown probability distribution
Pxy(xvi,yvi) at each node v ∈ V . Also, there is fixed but unknown conditional probability distribution Px|y(xvi|yvi = q)
for data points {xvi}nvi=1 given yvi = q, where q =−1 or 1.
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Assumption 5. εv(t) is drawn fromKv(ε)∼ e−ζv(t)‖ε‖, with the same αv(t) = α(t) (thus the same ζv(t)) for all v ∈ V
at time t ∈ Z.
According to Assumption 4, we define the conditional expected loss function of the classifier fv of vehicle v, given y as:
Jˆ( fv|y) :=C1Ex∼Px|y(L (y f T x)|y); thus, the corresponding conditional expected objective function Zˆv is Zˆv( fv|y) :=
Jˆ( fv|y)+ρR( fv).
The performance of non-private centralized ERM classification optimization has been already studied in the literature
(e.g., [42, 43]). For example, Shalev et al. in [42] introduces a reference classifier f 0, and shows that there is a lower
bound of the training data size such that the actual (unconditional) expected loss of the l2 regularized support vector
machine (SVM) classifier fSV M satisfies Jˆ( fSV M)≤ Jˆ0 +µ, where µ is the generalization error and Jˆ0 = Jˆ( f 0). The
similar argument can be used in this work to study the accuracy of Algorithm 2 in terms of conditional expected loss.
Let Jˆ0x|y=q = Jˆ( f 0|y = q). We quantify the performance of Algorithm 2 with the final output f ∗ by the minimum
number of data points required to obtain Jˆ( f ∗|y = q)≤ Jˆ0x|y=q+µq.
However, instead of focusing on only the final output f ∗ = argmin fv Zv( fv|Dv,y = q), for all v ∈ V , we also care about
the performance of the output of each iteration. Let f nonv (t+1) = argmin fv L
N
v (t) be the output of iteration t of the (non-
private) Algorithm 2 at vehicle v. Literature has proved that the sequence { f nonv (t)} is bounded and converges to f ∗ as
time t→∞ (e.g., [39]). Thus, there exists a constant Cnonq (t) at time t such that Jˆ( f nonv (t)|y= q)− Jˆ( f ∗|y= q)≤Cnonq (t),
and substituting it to Jˆ( f ∗)≤ Jˆ0+µq yields:
Jˆ( f nonv (t)|y)≤ Jˆ0x|y=q+Cnonq (t)+µq. (18)
As shown later in this section, the training data size depends on the ‖ f 0 ‖. Usually, the reference classifier is selected
with an upper bound on ‖ f 0 ‖. Theorem 2 summarizes the performance analysis of Algorithm 2 based on (18).
Theorem 2. Let R( fv(t))= 12 ‖ fv(t) ‖2, and let f 01 and f 0−1 such that Jˆ( f 01 |1)= Jˆ0x|1 and Jˆ( f 0−1|−1)= Jˆ0x|−1, respectively,
for all v ∈ V at time t, and δq > 0 is a positive real number for q = 1 and −1. Let Dv =
{
(xiv,yiv)⊂Rd×{−1,1}
}
be the dataset of vehicle v ∈ V . Let D(1)v and D(−1)v be the dataset containing all the data points xvi labeled as 1
and −1, respectively; and let n(1)v and n(−1)v be the size of D(1)v and D(−1)v , respectively; thus Dv = D(1)v ∪D(−1)v , and
nv = n
(1)
v + n
(−1)
v . Let f nonv (t + 1) = argmin fv L
N
v ( fv, t|Dv) be the output of Algorithm 2. If Assumption 1 and 4 are
satisfied, then there exist two constants C(1)3 and C
(−1)
3 such that if n
(1)
v and n
(−1)
v satisfy
n(1)v >C
(1)
3
(
C1 ‖ f 01 ‖2 ln( 1δ1 )
µ21
)
,
and
n−1v >C
1
3
(
C1 ‖ f 0−1 ‖2 ln( 1δ−1 )
µ2−1
)
,
then f nonv (t+1) satisfies
P
(
Jˆ( f nonv (t+1)|y = q)≤ Jˆ0x|y=q+µq+Cnonq (t)
)≥ 1−δq,
for all t ∈ Z+. Therefore, both false positive and false negative errors are bounded with probability at least 1−δq.
Proof. See Appendix D in [32].
Usually, µq ≤ 1 is required for most machine learning algorithms. In the case of SVM, if the constraints are yi f T xi ≤
CSV M , for i = 1, , ..., nSV M , the classification margin is
CSV M
‖ f 0‖ . Therefore, if we want to maximize the margin
CSV M
‖ f 0‖ , a
large value of ‖ f 0 ‖ is required. A larger value of ‖ f 0 ‖ is usually chosen for non-separable or small-margin problems.
In the following subsection, we use the similar analysis for the performance of Algorithm 3.
5.1 Performance of DVP
Similarly, Algorithm 3 solves one optimization problem minimizing Ldualv ( fv, t|Dv) at each iteration t vehicle v. Suppose
at iteration τ , we generate a noise term εv(τ) = ε . If we fix the noise term εv(t ′) = ε for all t ′ > τ , then the algorithm
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becomes static starting from τ . Let Alg-2 denotes this corresponding static algorithm associated with Algorithm 3.
Therefore, solving Alg-2 is equivalent to solving the optimization problem with the object function Zdualv ( fv,τ|Dv,ε),
defined as follows:
Zdualv ( fv,τ|Dv,ε) := Zv( fv|Dv)+
C1
nv
ε fv.
Let Zdualv (τ) be the short-hand notation of Zdualv ( fv,τ|Dv,ε). Note that the index τ indicates that this objective is based
on the noise εv(τ) = ε generated at iteration τ of Algorithm 3. Let f ′v(t) and λ ′v(t) be the primal and dual updates,
respectively, of the ADMM-based algorithm minimizing Zdualv (τ) at iteration t. Then, Alg-2 can be interpreted as
minimizing Zdualv (τ) with f ′v(0) = fv(τ) and λ ′v(0) = λv(τ) as initial conditions for all v ∈ V . Since Zdualv (τ) is real and
convex, similar to Algorithm 2, the sequence { f ′v(t)} is bounded and f ′v(t) converges to f
′∗
v (τ) = argmin f ′v Z
dual
v (τ),
which is a limit point of f ′v(t). Therefore, there exists a constant Cdualv,y=q(t) given noise term ε fixed from iteration τ of
Algorithm 3 such that
Jˆ( fv(τ)|y = q)− Jˆ( f ′∗(τ)|y = q)≤Cdualv,y=q(t),
for q = 1 or −1. The way we analyze the performance in Theorem 2 can also be used in the case of DVP. Specifically,
the performance is measured by the training data sizes, n(1)v and n
(−1)
v for data points xvi labeled by yvi = 1 and yvi =−1,
respectively, for all v ∈ V required to obtain
Jˆ( fv(τ)|y = q)≤ Jˆ0x|y=q(τ)+µq+Cdualv,y=q(τ),
for q = 1 and −1. We say that each fv(τ) is accurate with low false positive (1) or false negative (−1) error if it satisfies
the above inequality. The analysis of the performance for Algorithm 3, the DVP, is summarized in Theorem 3 and
Corollary 3.1.
Theorem 3. Let R( f )= 12 ‖ f ‖2, and let f 0v,y=1(τ) and f 0v,y=−1(τ) such that Jˆ( f 0y=1(τ)|1)= Jˆ0x|y=1(τ) and Jˆ( f 0y=−1(τ)|−
1) = Jˆ0x|y=−1(τ) for all v∈V . Let δ1 and δ−1 be positive numbers. Let Dv =D
(1)
v ∪D(−1)v =
{
(xiv,yiv)⊂Rd×{−1,1}
}
be the labeled dataset of vehicle v ∈ V , where D(1)v and D(−1)v are the datasets of size n(1)v and n(−1)v , respectively,
containing all the data points xvi labeled as 1 and −1, respectively. If Assumption 1, 4 and 5 are satisfied, then there
exist two constants C(1)4 and C
(−1)
4 such that if the number of data points n
(q)
v satisfies
n(q)v >C
(q)
4 max
(
max
τ
(‖ f 0v,y=q(τ) ‖ d ln( dδq )
µqαv(τ)
)
,max
t
(C1C2 ‖ f 0v,y=q(τ) ‖2
µqαv(τ)
)
,max
t
(C1 ‖ f 0v,y=q(τ) ‖2 ln( 1δq )
µ2q
))
,
then f ∗v (τ) satisfies
P
(
Jˆ( f ∗v (τ)|y = q)≤ Jˆ0x|y=q(τ)+µq
)≥ 1−2δq,
for all q = 1 and −1.
Proof. See Appendix E in [32].
Corollary 3.1. Let fv(τ) = argmin fv Ldualv ( fv,τ−1|Dv) be the updated classifier of Algorithm 3 and let f 0v,y=q(τ) be
a reference classifier such that Jˆ( f 0v (τ)|y = q) = Jˆ0x|y=q(τ) for q = 1 and −1. If all the conditions of Theorem 3 are
satisfied, then fv(τ) satisfies
P
(
Jˆ( fv(τ)|y = q)≤ Jˆ0x|y=q(τ)+µq+Cdualv,y=q(τ)
)≥ 1−2δq, (19)
for all q = 1 and −1.
Proof. The inequality Jˆ( fv(τ)|y = q)− Jˆ( f ∗v (τ)|q)≤Cdualv,y=q(τ) holds for fv(τ) and f ∗v (τ), for q = 1 and −1, and from
Theorem 3, P
(
Jˆ( f ∗v (τ)|y = q)≤ Jˆ0x|y=q(τ)+µq
)≥ 1−2δq, for q = 1 and −1. Therefore, we can have (19).
6 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we test the learning performance of Algorithm 3 and explore the tradeoff between security and privacy.
We simulate the user and system activities, the communication activities in the AUs and OBUs of the VANET based on
the NSL-KDD data, which is the refined version of its predecessor of KDD’99 and solves some of the inherent problems
of the KDD’99 [44]. The NSL-KDD dataset contains essential records of the complete KDD dataset. Each record
12
A PREPRINT - MAY 5, 2020
(a) DVP: αv = 0.01 (b) DVP: αv = 0.5
(c) Tradeoff: empirical risk (d) ROC
Figure 5. Figure 5a-5b: convergence with different (fixed) values of αv(t); DVP with ρ = 10−2.5, C1 = 650; non-private (Algorithm
2) with ρ = 10−9, C1 = 1250. Figure 5c: security-privacy tradeoff measured by the false positive and false negative error rates with
Cv1 = 20, Cv2 = 6, Cv3 = 5, Cv4 = 1. Figure 5d:Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for non-private, DVP with different
values of αv; DVP with ρ = 10−2.5, C1 = 650; non-private (Algorithm 2) with ρ = 10−9, C1 = 1250.
contains 41 attributes indicating different features of flow with a label assigned either as an attack or normal. Due to the
lack of public datasets for network-based IDSs, the NSL-KDD is currently the best available dataset for benchmarking
of different intrusion detection methods [17, 44].
In the experiments, the task is to classifier whether a network activity is an attack (1) or normal (−1) using logistic
regression. There are four types of attacks presented in NSL-KDD, namely, denial of service, probing, unauthorized
access to local system administrator privileges, and unauthorized access from a remote machine [45]. In this experiment,
we only classify whether an activity is an attack or normal without identifying the specific type of the attack.
We also propose an approach to select an optimal value of αv(t) that can manage the tradeoff between security and
privacy by introducing a utility function of privacy. In the experiments, we fix the value of αv(t) for each entire running
of Algorithm 3; thus, the noise of each vehicle v ∈ V generated at each running of DVP is i.i.d.
To process the NSL-KDD dataset into a form suitable for the classification learning and satisfying the Assumption
3, we process the NSL-KDD dataset according to the procedures suggested in [46]. The main processes include the
transformation of symbolic attributes to numeric values, feature selection that eliminates irrelevant, noisy or redundant
features, data normalization that helps speed up the learning.
When the P-CML engine in vehicle v is initiated, collaboration is established over the VANET. As shown in Figure 1,
the vehicle v ∈ V only communicates with vehicles in its one-hop neighborhood composed of three vehicles, a, b, and
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c ∈Nv, which also communicate with neighboring vehicles directly or through the RSU (e.g., a and c). Each vehicle in
the collaboration updates its own primal and dual parameters simultaneously.
6.1 Logistic Regression
In the experiments, we test the DVP-based Algorithm 3 using logistic regression. LetLlr be the loss function of logistic
regression, which has the form
Llr(yiv f T xiv) = log(1+ exp(−yiv f Tv xiv)).
Clearly, the first and the second order derivatives of Llr can be bounded as |L ′lr| ≤ 1 and |L ′′lr | ≤ 14 , respectively.
Therefore, the logistic regression satisfies the conditions in Assumption 1 with C2 = 14 . In this paper, we use the
regularization function R( fv) = 12 ‖ fv ‖2. Then, we can directly useL =Llr in Theorem 1 to guarantee the DDP.
6.2 Convergence of Collaborative Learning
In the first set of experiments, we test the convergence of Algorithm 3. The learning performance is measured by the
empirical risk (ER). In this experiment, each entire running of the algorithm is based on a fixed value of αv(t). Figure
5a and 5b show the test results. As can be seen, larger αv(t)’s lead to faster convergence; for αv = 0.5, the converged
ER is close to the ER of non-private learning (i.e., Algorithm 2).
6.3 Security-Privacy Tradeoff
Figure 6. Mobility of VANET: There are three main factors that can cause the changes of the VANET topology, namely, the inflow
and the outflow of vehicles, the speed change, and the position change.
In this subsection, we explore the tradeoff between the required privacy of training data at each vehicle and the security
of the IDS using the classifier trained via the collaborative learning over the VANET. The privacy is quantified by the
value of αv(t). Basically, a larger αv(t) leads to a larger likelihood ratio Q( fv(t)|Dv)/Q( fv(t)|D′v), which implies a
higher belief of the adversaries about the change of any single entry of the training dataset. Therefore, larger αv(t)’s
yields lower privacy. However, the performance of the algorithm increases when the value of αv(t) grows; higher
performance leads to higher level of security. This decreasing monotonicity relationship shows a tradeoff between
security and privacy.
We propose an approach to determine an optimal value of αv(t) that can well manage the security-privacy tradeoff by
constructing the utility functions of security and privacy. The design of utility functions at every vehicle v ∈ V has to
satisfy the conditions stated in the following assumption:
Assumption 6. The utility of security is monotonically increasing in αv(t) while the utility of privacy is monotonically
decreasing in αv(t).
We use the empirical loss (ER), J(t) = C1nv ∑
nv
i=1Llr(yiv fv(t)
T xiv), to quantify the security (smaller J(t) is, higher the
security is). Let Usec(·) :R+→R denote utility of security that describes the relationship between J(t) and αv(t). The
function Usec is determined by the experimental result, i.e., (αv(t),J(t)) using curve fitting. Figure 5c verifies that
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Usec (curve fit in green) monotonically decreases with respect to αv(t) thus the security and αv(t) has a monotonic
decreasing relationship.
The utility of privacy is designed to meet specific requirements of privacy of each vehicle. Let Upri(·) : R+ → R
represent the utility of privacy. Beside the decreasing monotonicity, Upri(·) is also required to be convex and doubly
differentiable such that the optimal value of αv(t) can be obtained by solving a convex optimization problem. In this
experiment, we give an example of utility of privacy defined as
Upri(αv(t)) =Cv1 · ln Cv2Cv3αv(t)+Cv4α2v (t)
,
for αv(t) ≤ 1, where Cvi ∈ R++ for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Then, the optimal value of αv(t) is determined by solving the
following problem at iteration t:
min
αv(t)
Z (t) =Usec(αv(t))−Upri(αv(t))
s.t. 0 < αv(t)≤ 1, 0≤Usec(αv(t))≤U1,
(20)
where U1 is the threshold value for Usec beyond which is considered as insecure.
In the experiments, we use a few fixed values of ρ and calculate the empirical loss J(t) = C1nv ∑
nv
i=1Llr(yiv fv(t)
T xiv) of
the classifier. The value of ρ that gives the minimum J for a fixed value of αv(t) (We use 0.2 in this experiment). The
simulation of Algorithm 2, the non-private algorithm, is used as the control. In our experiments, we set ρ = 10−9 and
10−2.5 for Algorithm 2 and 3, respectively, and set C1 = 1250 and 650 for Algorithm 2 and 3, respectively.
Figure 5c shows the tradeoff between security and privacy of the DVP at the fixed number of iterations. We model the
following function by curve fitting, Lacc(αv(t)) =C5 ·e−C6αv(t)+C7, where C j ∈R+, for j = 5, 6, 7. In our experiment,
we determine C5 = 0.055, C6 = 40, C7 =mint{J(t)} Figure 5d shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
of the outputs of Algorithm 2, and Algorithm 3 with different values of αv(t). We can see that when αv(t) increases,
the ROC of the output of the DVP is close to that of the non-private Algorithm 2. This also shows the tradeoff between
security and privacy in terms of the ROC. This feature makes it possible to find an optimal value of αv(t) such that
Algorithm 3 performs similar to Algorithm 2.
6.3.1 Impact of Changing Number of Vehicles in a VANET
We also investigate how the accuracy changes when we increase the number of vehicles in a VANET. In this experiment,
we fix the number of ADMM iterations to 45 and examine three VANETs with 4, 8, and 16 vehicles, respectively, using
NSL-KDD dataset.
Figure 7a shows the convergence results for different P. As can be seen, a larger VANET size converges to a smaller
value of empirical risk (ER). Figure 7b shows the tradeoff between security and privacy in terms of the ER. We can see
that larger P performs better in managing the tradeoff between security and privacy.
6.4 Topology-Varying VANET
Due to the high mobility of the vehicles, the topology of a VANET changes frequently. In this paper, we also examine
the impact of topology-varying VANET in the security and privacy. As shown in Figure 6, the changes of topology
can be caused by the inflow and the outflow of the vehicles, the changes of speed, the changes of the positions, or
the combinations of these. We focus on the activities of a specific vehicle v ∈ V . Let V T represent the number of
topology changes during the one collaborative learning. Let V (i) be the i-th topology for i = 1, ...,V T , and let k(i) be
the corresponding number of iterations spent at V (i). Let P(i) be the number of vehicles at the topology V (i). P(i)
can be changed by the inflow and the outflow. V T can be changed by the changes of the speed and the position. The
increase and the decrease of speed also change the values of k(i). The collaborative learning scenario at vehicle v over
the topology-varying VANET can be described as follows. At V (i), there are P(i) vehicles and v collaborates with
its neighboring vehicles; after k(i) iterations, the VANET topology changes to V (i+1) with P(i+1) vehicles; after
k(i+1) iterations, the VANET topology changes to V (i+2), and so on. In practice, the changes of VANET topology
are very fast and complex. We simulate some varying-topology scenarios to study the impact of varying topologies at
the outputs of our algorithms. In the following two sets of experiments, we consider two cases of topology-varying
VANET. In Case 1, we fix the value of P(i) = P for i = 1, ...,V T , where P is a constant, while in Case 2, we test the
results when P(i) changes for different i.
We conduct two experiments in Case 1. In the first experiment, we consider V T = 5, and fix P(i) = 4 and k(i) = 45k ,
which is an integer, for all i = 1, ....,V T , and we vary the value of V T . Figure 7c-7d show the results of convergence
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(a) DVP: αv = 0.5. (b) Tradeoff: empirical risk.
(c) Convergence with αv = 0.5. (d) Tradeoff: empirical risk
Figure 7. Figure 7a-7b: convergence with different (fixed) values of αv(t) with fixed 45 ADMM iterations; DVP with ρ = 10−2.5,
C1 = 650. Figure 7b: security-privacy tradeoff measured by empirical risk for P = 4, P = 8, and P = 16 vehicles. Figure 7c-7d:
convergence and security-private tradeoff, respectively, with fixed P = 4, fixed the total number of iterations as 45, and different
values of V T per collaborative learning; DVP with ρ = 10−2.5, C1 = 650.
and the security-privacy tradeoff for V T = 1, V T = 3, and V T = 5. From Figure 7c, we can see that the values of ER
experience jump when the VANET topology changes. Also, the larger value of V T (more changes of VANET topology)
gives smaller values of ER as the number of iterations increases, which is also reflected in Figure 7d. The tradeoff
results shown in Figure 7d indicate that a larger value of V T , i.e., more frequent change of VANET topology, has a
better performance in managing the security-privacy tradeoff.
In the second experiment in Case 1, we test the impact on the results when the speed of vehicle changes, which is
quantified by the change of k(i). We fix P(i) = 4, for all i = 1, ....,V T , and V T = 3. Figure 8a shows that there is no
obvious difference in the value of ER between the fixed speed and the increasing speed. Also, Figure 8b does not show
an obvious difference between fixed speed and varying speed regarding managing the security-privacy tradeoff.
In the experiment of Case 2, we fix V T = 3, and k(i) = 15, for i = 1,2,3. We test the results when the number of
vehicles P(i) increases as i increases. Figure 8c shows the results of convergence. From the convergence results, we can
see that a larger density of vehicles per topology has smaller values of ER; also the increasing density of vehicles per
topology has smaller values of ER than the fixed-density topology-varying VANET and the fixed-topology VANET.
Figure 8d shows the behavior of the tradeoff between security and privacy. The results show that increasing P(i) (more
inflow of vehicles) outperforms the topology-varying with fixed P(i) and the fixed-topology case.
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(a) Convergence with αv = 0.5 (b) Tradeoff: empirical risk
(c) Convergence with αv = 0.5. (d) Tradeoff: empirical risk
Figure 8. Figure 8a-8b: convergence and security-private tradeoff, respectively, with fixed P = 4, fixed total number of iterations as
45, fixed V T = 3; the result of V T = 1 is used for comparison; in the case of fixed speed, k(1) = k(2) = k(3) = 15; in the case of
increasing speed, k(1) = 25, k(2) = 15, k(3) = 5; DVP with ρ = 10−2.5, C1 = 650. Figure 8c-8d: convergence and security-private
tradeoff, respectively, with a fixed total number of iterations as 45, fixed V T = 3, fixed k(1) = k(2) = k(3) = 15; the result of V T = 1
is used for comparison; in the case of fixed P(i) = 4 for i = 1,2,3, inflow and outflow neutralize each other; in the case of increasing
P(i), P(1) = 4, P(2) = 10, P(3) = 16; DVP with ρ = 10−2.5, C1 = 650.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have described an architecture for a collaborative intrusion detection system using privacy-preserving
distributed machine learning. The privacy-preserving scheme for the distributed collaborative-based learning is essential
for achieving a private collaboration; otherwise, the distributed machine learning itself creates privacy leakage of the
training data. We have proposed a privacy-preserving machine-learning based collaborative intrusion detection system
(PML-CIDS). The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) approach is used to decentralize the empirical
risk minimization (ERM) problem that models the collaborative learning into the distributed ERM well-suited to the
nature of the VANET system.
We have proposed the dynamic differential privacy and presented dual variable perturbation (DVP) to protect the privacy
of the training data by perturbing the dual variable λv(t). We have also analyzed the theoretical performance of the
DVP, which is measured by the minimum training data size required to train a classifier with low error. The tradeoff
between security and privacy has been investigated through numerical experiments. The data used in the experiments is
the NSL-KDD dataset. We also have proposed a design principle to select an optimal value of the privacy parameter
αv(t) by solving an optimization problem such that both the security and privacy are optimized. The experiments
have also studied the impact of the different VANET size, and the changing VANET topology during the collaborative
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learning. As future work, we intend to investigate the collaborative IDS with both supervised and unsupervised machine
learning and extend the dynamic differential privacy to different machine learning techniques. We also intend to study
the methods of fast incremental learning that can be used in the frequent updates of the machine-learning-based IDSs.
A Appendix
A.1 Architecture of Vehicular Ad Hoc Network
In this appendix, we describe these three main components of the VANET architecture [47, 48].
A.1.1 On Board Unit (OBU)
An OBU is a communication device equipped on vehicles for vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure commu-
nications through the dedicated short-range communication (DSRC). DSRC is based on IEEE 802.11a technology
amended for the low overhead operation to 802.11p [1]. The AUs in vehicles use OBUs to communicate with other
AUs in other vehicles, and the information exchange is done by OBUs over the ad hoc network. The functions and
procedures of an OBU contain wireless radio access, message transfer, geographical ad hoc routing, network congestion
control, data security, IP mobility support and others. The basic communication system of an OBU is composed of
a minimum set of safety applications, the communication protocol stack with communication transport and network
layer, the radio protocols with the IEEE 802.11p devices, and an interface to the local sensors mounted on vehicles.
OBUs can also include additional network devices for non-safety applications using other radio technologies like IEEE
802.11a/b/g/n [48].
A.1.2 Application Unit (AU)
An AU is a device mounted on the vehicle and operates the application installed that uses the communication capabilities
of the OBU. Applications can be safety applications such as hazard warning, navigation with communication capabilities,
or the Internet-based application such as the personal digital assistant (PDA) [48].
A.1.3 Roadside Unit (RSU)
An RSU is a device located at the fixed positions on the roadside, along highways, or at dedicated locations like parking
place or gas stations. Each RSU is equipped with at least one network device for short-range wireless communications
based on IEEE 802.11p radio technology. It can also be equipped with other network devices, thereby enabling
communications with the infrastructure network. The main functions of an RSU include [48]:
• Redistributing information to an OBU, thereby extending the communication range of the ad hoc network.
• Running safety applications such as virtual traffic sign, vehicle-to-infrastructure warnings like accident
warning.
• Enabling the OBUs to connect to the cloud and other infrastructures.
A.2 PML-CIDS Components
In this appendix, we will elaborate on each component of the PML-CIDS architecture.
A.2.1 Pre-processing Engine
The pre-processing engine collects and pre-processes real-time audit data flows from OBU and various applications
in the AU. These data flows may include user and system activities in the AU and the access request behaviors from
outside of the vehicle; it also can be the communication activities between different OBUs or between OBU and RSUs.
The pre-processing includes the transformation of symbolic attributes to numerical values, features selection, and data
normalization to reduce the possible large variation between values.
A.2.2 Local Detection Engine
The local detection engine analyzes the audit data flows processed by the pre-processing engine by a classifier trained
via the P-CML engine. If a specific activity is classified as an intrusion, then the local detection engine triggers the
alarm. The user of the vehicle determines how often the classifier needs to be re-trained. If an update of the classifier is
required, the local detection engine will initiate the P-CML engine.
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A.2.3 P-CML Engine
When the P-CML engine is initiated, the ADMM-based private distributed machine learning operates over a temporarily
established VANET by collaborating with other vehicles and RSUs. Each vehicle stores its local labeled training dataset.
The training dataset can be the historical intrusion activities that have been detected in each vehicle, the data collected
by putting sensors on the VANET (for example, getting TCP or Netflow [17]), or the data provided by the trustworthy
parties like the Department of Transportation. The participation of RSUs in P-CML enables vehicles to connect to
vehicles in distance and other infrastructures such as the cloud.
The P-CML engine is composed of three components, namely, the collaborative communication (CC) engine, the
distributed local learning (DLL), and the privacy-preserving (PP) mechanism. The DLL engine updates its local
ADMM variables including the dual and the primal variables using its local training dataset and the primal variables
transmitted from neighboring vehicles at each ADMM iteration. The PP engine at each vehicle provides dynamic
differential privacy to the VANET involved in the collaboration. At each ADMM iteration, the CC engine uses the
OBU to exchange the intermediately updated parameters with the CC engines of the neighboring vehicles through the
low-latency communication [49] based on the DSRC.
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